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The economic impact of foreign aid on poverty alleviation: A case of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This research paper examines the economic impact of foreign aid on poverty for Sub-Saharan 
African countries. In this empirical analysis I have ascertained that foreign aid has an impact 
in reducing poverty in 42 Sub-Saharan African countries from 1980-2013. Panel estimation 
techniques and instrumental variables are used in order to control for country specific time 
varying effects and endogeneity. Based on the empirical analysis, I concluded that aid is 
effective in reducing poverty after controlling for macroeconomic variables. The findings are 
consistent on all poverty measures, the poverty gap, poverty depth, and poverty severity. 
Thus, sound macroeconomic policies and good institutional quality are also necessary factors 
in achieving sustainable poverty reduction strategies in recipient countries.   
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1.0 Introduction   
Persistent travesty of poverty vicious circle in developing world has led to many questions 
being raised to the efficacy of foreign aid as a means of reducing poverty in recipient 
countries. Correlation between foreign aid and poverty is certainly suggestive, but the 
causation has been widely debated. Rising poverty levels and how they can be ameliorated 
remains a dilemma in the international development debate. More specifically, the two 
questions at the center of academic research are why some countries remain poor and other 
countries richer? Why is aid not eradicating poverty in Sub-Saharan African countries? 
Further, researchers are interested in assessing why Sub-Saharan African countries remained 
poor despite receiving a substantial amount of foreign aid from donor countries.  
On one hand, proponents of foreign aid postulate that though foreign aid has failed in some 
countries, it has fostered economic growth and poverty reduction in countries like South 
Korea and Indonesia.  Bauer asserts that foreign aid is a necessary instrument for economic 
development, a powerful tool for income redistribution and serves the interests of the 
developed countries (Bauer 1981: 97). (Burnside & Dollar (2001), Masud & Yontcheva 
(2005), Alvi & Sanbeta (2012) assert that multilateral aid has seen to reduce poverty, while 
bilateral aid has no negative impact on poverty reduction, thus foreign aid is useful in 
reducing poverty if the intended objective is specifically tailored towards poverty reduction. 
On the other hand, opponents of foreign aid argue that foreign aid has been wasted on 
frivolous expenses and has perpetuated bad governments to stay in power, and instead it has 
enriched the elites in poor countries and harmed the private sector (Easterly 2003). Other 
critiques of foreign aid posit that aid has not been effective because of donor countries that 
tend to give conditional and tied aid.  
Since 1970, Sub-Saharan Africa has received a substantial amount of foreign aid from donor 
countries. Yet, Sub-Saharan Africa remains one of the poorest regions in the world, with real 
income per capita lower today than in the 1970s. While the number of the world’s population 
living in poverty fell in 1980, between 1985 and 2005, the number of people in Sub-Saharan 
Africa living in poverty nearly doubled, leaving the average African person today poor than 
two decades ago (World Bank Development Indicators,  2018). Poverty is on the rise in most 
SSA countries and it has become a major task for United Nations (UN) and the World Bank 
to eradicate poverty and hunger by 2030. As a policy measure to eradicate poverty, the Heads 
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of state in the UN declaration accord of 2000 resolved to embark on debt cancellation, 
improving market access, increasing Foreign Direct Investment and enhancing the Official 
Development Assistance in Sub-Saharan African Countries (UN Sustainable Developmental 
Goals). Donor countries in the Organization for Economic Development have agreed on 
channeling 0.7 percent of their Gross National Income (GNI) as foreign aid (OECD Statistics, 
2018). 
This paper seeks to assess whether foreign aid can be a necessary tool that can be used to 
achieve poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan African countries. The research question that this 
paper seeks to answer is whether foreign aid can cause a reduction in poverty? Therefore in 
this paper I will argue that foreign aid reduces poverty in SSA countries after controlling for 
macroeconomic variables and the quality of institutions. 
 
2.0 LITERATURE ON AID EFFECTIVENESS  
 2.1 Aid and Growth Relationship  
Ideally, it is perceived that an increase in foreign aid raises average income per capita in the 
recipient country which in turn lessens poverty. This scholarly view infers an increase in aid 
ultimately cause a rise in income levels and ultimately reducing poverty. Concerns can be 
raised with such a hypothesis. It remains imperative in assessing if aid fosters an increase in 
income growth or whether aid raises the income threshold of the poor. These questions are 
separate and they should be addressed differently. This is only attainable if aid tailored for 
poverty reduction is allocated specifically to bolster countries with extreme poverty levels. In 
other situations overall growth may be nonexistent or take considerable time to be realized 
but poverty may still be reduced. Senbeta (2009) argues that growth can reduce poverty in 
three ways. Firstly, by implicitly assuming that foreign aid only reduces poverty by 
increasing economic growth. Secondly, that aid is more effective in increasing growth and 
ultimately reducing poverty. Finally, that poverty efficient allocation of aid assumes 
diminishing returns to aid. What remains clear is that poverty reduction can be tackled from 
two fronts: via the growth led effect or by improving credit service extension and increasing 
the asset allocation to those living below a poverty datum threshold (Lensink & White 
2000:5). In this paper I argue that foreign aid does reduce poverty in SSA countries. Further it 
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can also be noted that an increase in credit provision to the poor helps to reduce poverty.  
Domestic credit reduces poverty at better levels compared to foreign aid and therefore SSA 
governments should ensure there is provision for access to finance. Empirical studies have 
ascertained that a sustained and inclusive economic growth is sine qua non in poverty 
mitigation (Dollar & Kray, 2004; Chambers, Wu, & Yao 2008). Literature on foreign aid 
effectiveness show that aid seem to work in countries with economic growth led  policies 
such as development of a sound financial system, macroeconomic stability policies, quality of 
institutions, openness to trade,  and remittances and thus systematically reduce the poverty 
levels (Alvi & Senbetta 2012).   
The objectives of the research will be firstly, to assess whether foreign aid helps reducing 
poverty in Sub Saharan African countries after controlling for macroeconomic variables and 
other independent variables relevant in determining poverty levels. Secondly, to assess 
whether domestic credit can be a sustainable solution in reducing poverty in SSA countries. 
In assessing the aid and poverty relationship, my specification builds on the findings of 
Radelet & Clemens (2005), Alvi & Senbetta (2012) Burnside and Dollar (2000) of analyzing 
the effectiveness of foreign aid and checking for systematic difference in relationship to 
poverty reduction. Not all aid is alike, and the purpose for which it is channeled plays a role. 
Further, the development of the financial sector in channeling domestic credit to the poor can 
be a sustainable mechanism to eradicate poverty. Empirical research has been conducted on 
the impact of foreign aid and poverty. However, different measures of poverty have been 
used. Other research has focused on headcount index, and Masud and Yoncheva (2005) has 
used human development indicators to assess the relationship between foreign aid. In their 
paper they found that aid had a reduce poverty in relationship with human development 
indicators. Alvi and Senbeta (2012) also analyzed the impact of foreign aid and poverty and 
they used poverty gap, poverty depth and severity poverty index on 81 countries. In their 
research findings they controlled for the covariates of aid and concluded that aid reduces 
poverty after taking into consideration effects of average income. My paper uses a dataset 
from povcalnet with three different measures of poverty proposed by Foster et al (1984). 
Emphasis has been placed on the 42 Sub-Saharan African countries from the period of 1980-
2013 where over 40 percent of the population lives in dire circumstances of extreme poverty 
(UNDP Statistics, 2018).  
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In this paper I will proceed as follows: chapter 2 will focus on the literature of foreign aid 
effectiveness and poverty reduction. In chapter 3, I will describe the data and the research 
methodology, and chapter 4, I will analyze the data. I will then discuss the results, policy 
implications and conclusion.  
2.2 Foreign Aid and Poverty Reduction 
Foreign Aid as defined by OECD refers to the “voluntary transfer of public resources, from 
one government to another independent government, to an NGO, or to an international 
organization (such as World Bank or the UN Development program) with at least a 25 
percent grant element” Lancaster (2007). Lancaster identified four purposes of extending 
foreign aid which are for development, humanitarian relief, diplomatic and commercial 
purposes (ibid). Literature on aid has concluded that aid is issued by donor countries for 
strategic interests (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Literature on aid effectiveness ascertain that  
aid for development purposes in the 1970s mainly focused on the transfer of wealth from 
donor countries to meet the basic needs of those impoverished in the recipient countries, and 
in 1980s it was meant for stimulating economic growth and economic policy reform in 
recipient countries. In 1990s aid for development focused on good governance of institutions 
that supported economic progress and poverty reduction. Thus, aid for development, 
according to Radelet (2006), is tailor made towards boosting productive sectors of the 
recipient countries e.g. agriculture, or to bring about new technological advancements and 
improving education and health services delivery in recipient countries. Aid channeled for 
humanitarian relief was mainly through the spirit of altruism that rich countries are compelled 
helping poor countries as they are endowed with resources. Therefore it became a moral 
obligation of rich countries to help poor countries. In so doing donor countries agreed upon a 
contribution of 0.7 percent of Gross National Income to be allocated to poor countries 
(OECD Statistics 2018). Aid for diplomatic purposes focused on political and strategic 
reasons. The motive of issuing bilateral aid is strengthening bilateral relations between 
governments and fostering international security reasons Lancaster (2007). Aid allocated for 
commercial purposes was meant to open up trade relations between donor country and 
recipient countries and strengthening bilateral agreements between countries (ibid). 
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The effectiveness of foreign aid has been looked at different aspects, depending with the type 
of foreign aid and its desired objectives in recipient countries. Recent literature has assessed 
the effectiveness of foreign aid as benchmarked to economic growth. (Radelet, 2006), argues 
that though some countries have received substantial amounts of foreign aid they have 
managed to achieve rapid growth, while the notion was different for other recipient countries 
that received similar or larger amounts and have achieved slow or negative growth rates. 
Therefore the relationship can be interpreted differently. Other countries e.g. Ethiopia, 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria that received substantial amounts of foreign aid 
might have been suffering from serious civil conflict or poor geographical location that aid 
has a positive impact on growth but the overall growth effect might be weak. Radelet 
suggests three views of foreign aid namely; “aid has a positive relationship with growth, 
under certain circumstances, and has diminishing returns; as the volume of aid increases”, aid 
has no effect on growth and it may be undermined under certain circumstances; and, aid has a 
provisional relationship with growth and can hasten growth under certain circumstances 
(ibid). Radelet et al (2005), firstly, concluded that the type of aid matters: humanitarian aid 
reduces growth as disasters reduce growth and increases the aid received in the recipient 
country and this humanitarian aid is not tailored for poverty reduction purpose only to help in 
emergence relief. Secondly, “Aid can affect growth, but indirectly and over a long period of 
time” (ibid).  With this late impact aid they found weak positive results on growth. Thirdly, 
for aid meant to improve growth immediately -- for example aid for infrastructure -- they 
found a positive relationship with growth (ibid). Collier & Dollar (1999) used the same 
approach of assessing foreign aid effectiveness by looking at growth. They suggested that 
donors should reallocate foreign aid to poor countries with good, sound policies and good 
institutions. Based on their findings it can be inferred that aid is effective in increasing 
growth and reducing poverty in countries with good policies and good institutions, mainly 
formal institutions which are rule of law, property rights and enforcement of contract laws. 
Their findings had been crucial for policy makers in allocating aid to countries with good 
policies, institutions and those with extreme poverty levels.  Boone argues that they are three 
political or economic regimes which are egalitarian, elitist and laissez faire would use foreign 
aid (Boone, 1996).  In his findings, an elitist regime has the motive to maximize the welfare 
of the elite; the motive of egalitarian regimes is to maximize the welfare of its poor citizens; 
and the laissez faire regime seeks to reduce taxes and distortions in the economy. In his 
findings, Boone concluded that aid neither increase investment nor growth nor benefit the 
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poor in recipient countries as measured by improvements in human development indicators 
(ibid). Further he posits that the impact of aid does not vary according to whether the 
recipient government political regime is liberal, democratic or highly repressive. Liberal 
regimes had 30 percent reduced infant mortality rates than other political regimes (ibid). 
Boone also implied that short term aid is targeted towards supporting liberal regimes, which 
might be a successful means of reducing poverty. Democracy has been seen as a necessary 
factor in building viable institutions and alleviating poverty in developing countries. 
However, Boone’s notion was criticized by Burnside & Dollar (2000); they came up with a 
policy index in which they incorporated budget surplus, openness of the economy, and 
inflation rate.  Their findings were that aid had a positive impact on growth after controlling 
for macroeconomic policies and the quality of policies and institutions (ibid). Their policy 
recommendations have been widely accepted: foreign aid should be increased to countries 
with good policies and higher poverty levels. The findings of Burnside and Dollar have been 
criticized by William Easterly (2003) who finds contrary results to what Burnside and Dollar 
found in 2000 when he enlarged the dataset. Other scholars (Dalgaard & Hansen 2001, Lu & 
Ram 2001) also replicated the study, used different datasets and different regression 
methodologies and estimates, and could not find similar results obtained by Burnside & 
Dollar.   
Aid has fosters economic growth in other countries, but diminishes as the volume of aid 
increases. The idea of good institutions was supported by Acemoglu et al. (2001), they 
emphasized that countries with good institutions benefit from the following attributes that are 
brought about by good institutions: good institutions enforce property rights, and prevent the 
actions of the elites, politicians and bad governments from abusing their power that tends to 
distort the outcome of the economy. However, the notion of good governance has been 
criticized by John Weiss (2008). He eluded that not all good governance reform is a panacea 
for development problems.  
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2.3 Fungibility of Foreign Aid 
“Fungibility” of foreign aid means the money intended for specific aid projects is misused. 
Thus foreign aid extended to recipient countries is expended on other unintended projects 
which might not be the objective of the donors. The notion that foreign aid is fungible has 
been raised by World Bank Economist, Paul Rosenstein-Rodin in 1947. Devarajan et al 
(1999) concluded that aid is fungible in Africa. They found out that a dollar increase in 
foreign aid results in a 90 cent increase in government spending. Chattarjee et al (2007), 
found similar results to Devarajan et al, thus in their model specification they incorporated 
total government expenditure in recipient economies and analyzed the changes in aggregate 
foreign aid. Their results indicated strong evidence of “fungibility” of about 70 cents of every 
foreign aid dollar received with investment aid being the most fungible, with almost 90 cents 
of every dollar received being fungible. Therefore, based on their foreign aid effectiveness 
test, they found that in the presence of “fungibility” aid has no positive effect in fostering 
economic growth.    
2.4 Financial Development and Poverty Alleviation   
Development of the financial sector can enable poverty reduction indirectly either by 
stimulating growth and eventually allowing the poor to benefit by undertaking profitable 
investments (Jeanneney & Kpodar, 2008). Conversely, the development of finance as 
evidenced by access to credit in some instances undermine the effort of poverty reduction as 
it widens the income inequality gap between the rich and poor in malfunctioning financial 
institutions and indirectly through adverse macroeconomic conditions (ibid).  Kuznets’ 
(1963) inverted U hypothesis argues that if a country develops, its income per capita rises, the 
degree of income inequality rises, and after reaching a certain maximum level it drops as the 
Gross Domestic Product per capita continues to rise.  
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2.5 Conclusion 
Given the ideas articulated above, there is clear certainty that researchers agree to the notion 
that aid can be effective in reducing poverty under certain macroeconomic conditions, and 
that donor and recipient countries are working tenaciously to make aid more effective in 
reducing poverty and fostering economic growth. This has been evidenced in the Paris 
Declaration of 2005, in which donor and recipient countries have adopted the five principles 
namely; ownership, alignment, harmonization, mutual accountability of foreign aid between 
donor and recipient countries and managing for results in a bid to improve the effectiveness 
of aid. However, the new found literacy in aid effectiveness has seen donor countries 
increasing selectivity by extending foreign aid to poor countries with ‘good’ macroeconomic 
policies, and ‘good’ institutions in order to ameliorate poverty. What then remains unclear is 
what exactly qualifies as ‘good’ institutions? Is it only formal or informal institutions that 
matter in aid allocation? Slow-moving institutions proposed by Gerard Roland (2004) such as 
norms, culture, societal values seem to be playing a pivotal role in fostering economic 
sustainable development and ultimately poverty reduction.  
Though it is interesting to assess the importance of slow moving institutions in their 
relationship to effectiveness of foreign aid but this is not the main focus of this research.  As I 
analyzed various papers on this topic what remains unclear is the impact of foreign aid and 
poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa region. Therefore the question remains whether recipient 
countries should depend on foreign aid to reduce poverty or develop its financial sector as a 
necessary tool in alleviating poverty.   This paper contributes to the assessment of foreign aid 
effectiveness as an economic tool to eradicate poverty in SSA countries. Given that foreign 
aid allocation is not consistent in its allocation and in some instances aid is received in 
nominal amounts in recipient countries, greater focus should be concentrated on better and 
sustainable measures of alleviating poverty in recipient countries. SSA countries should 
rather focus on building a resilient domestic credit to people living under extreme poverty as 
a more sustainable approach in alleviating poverty. Thus recipient countries should move 
away from aid dependency and hence cultivate extending domestic credit as an effective tool 
in eradicating poverty.  
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3.0 DATA DESCRIPTION AND STATISTICS  
    Table 1. Summary Statistics    
Panel A:Summary 
Statistics            
Variables 
                    
Obs  
           
Mean          Std. Dev  
           
Min 
            
Max 
Log Poverty Gap  608 3.56 0.997 -1.05 4.569 
Log Poverty Depth  608 2.569 1.263 -2.996 4.169 
Log Poverty Severity  608 1.862 1.466 -4.605 3.921 
Log Population  1496 6.314 0.989 0 7.311 
Private Credit (% of 
GDP) 1373 2.474 0.924 -1.856 5.076 
Aid (% of GNI) 1477 3.746 0.982 -4.683 6.539 
Log Finance  608 4.559 0.64 3.08 6.55 
Log GDP  1037 7.49 0.922 5.489 10.153 
Log Trade openness  856 5.631 0.573 4.152 7.235 
Log Inflation  1193 2.223 1.473 -4.074 10.103 
Landlocked Dummy  1496 0.364 0.481 0 1 
English Colony  1496 0.419 0.494 0 1 
Common Law  1496 0.477 0.5 0 1 
Freedom of Speech  924 3.496 0.648 0 4.317 
Economic Freedom 
Index  555 1.722 0.181 0.997 2.008 
Legal Origin  1496 0.419 0.5 0 1 
Gini  coefficient  615 82.924 47.46 1 163 
The dataset used in analyzing the poverty and aid relationship is obtained from the World 
Bank household survey on poverty and inequality; PovcalNet. Absolute poverty measures are 
obtained from over 500 household incomes covering over 100 developing countries (Chen & 
Ravallion, 2007). The period covered in this research is from 1980-2013. In this paper, I 
restricted the analysis to 42 out of 54 in SSA countries for which high quality information 
and the distribution of income data was available. Average income per capita for each 
household survey is converted to 2011 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). The international 
poverty line of $1.90 per day is converted to 2011 rate of $1.08 per day. Aid effectiveness 
data is obtained from OECD and is measured relative to Gross National Income. The panel 
dataset is fairly balanced with years ranging from 1980 to 2013. Due to availability of data 
there are gaps in between the years as the poverty levels  are measured as averages over a 
period of 3 years. The Pearson Correlation matrix for this dataset is shown in the appendix 
section.  
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3.1 Measurement of Absolute Poverty  
Absolute poverty is measured using the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke Index (1984). The 
FGT index has been well-recognized by policy makers as a good measure of poverty and 
inequality (Foster et al 2010:3). Absolute poverty is a better indicator of extreme poverty in a 
country as the measure indicates how one barely meets the basic essential needs (Todaro and 
Smith, 2015:226). Its axiomatic practices are sound and it has helpful properties of additive 
decomposability and subgroup consistency. The Index is calculated as follows: 
                                              𝑃ఈ =
ଵ
ே
∑ ൬௒ುି௒೔
௒೛
൰
ఈ
ு
௜ୀே
                                              (1.0)                                                                                                     
N is the population size, and H is the number of deprived people, and 𝑌௣ is the poverty line, 
and poverty gap is (𝑌௣-𝑌௜) where 𝑌௜ is the per capita income. 
 
α ≥ 0 is a parameter, when 
α = 0 is the Poverty gap measure (𝑃଴) 
α = 1 is the normalized Poverty Depth index (𝑃ଵ) 
α = 2 is the severity poverty  index(𝑃ଶ) 
The headcount count index (poverty gap) is a measure of the proportion of the 
deprived population living in a household of income per person below the poverty datum 
line. The pitfall of absolute poverty measurement is that it does not take into consideration 
the distribution of the people as no weight is given to the relative distance of the poor to the 
poverty line (Alvi and Senbetta 2012). Everyone living below the poverty line is counted as 
poor without any peculiarity how any individual is far from the poverty line. Poverty gap 
index (poverty depth) measures the income shortfall as a proportion of the poverty line. This 
measurement of absolute poverty expresses income needed to take the poor out of the poverty 
datum line expressed as a ratio of the poverty line. Squared poverty gap index (poverty 
severity index) squaring the shortfall in the poverty severity index allocates more weight to 
those living below the poverty line (ibid).  
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3.2 Endogeneity and foreign aid  
Endogeneity of foreign aid and poverty is a serious issue as non-robust results can 
result due to endogenous aid. Recent empirics on aid effectiveness studies test for the 
endogeneity biases in the estimated parameters resulting from endogenous aid. Endogeneity 
in foreign aid could arise from 1) the reverse causality between foreign aid and poverty, 2) it 
could be a result of measurement error, absolute poverty is measured with household surveys 
and collection of data is not consistent over a period of time which results in measurement 
error problems especially with African countries, 3) endogeneity could be a result of omitted 
variables in the econometric model. In most circumstances results will be produced 
disfavoring the effect of aid if the issue of endogeneity is not correctly addressed. However; 
accounting for country time invariant specific effects and incorporating instrumental 
variables is necessary to capture the true impact of foreign aid. In so doing, literature on aid 
effectiveness suggest lagging the aid variable. The reason for lagging the aid variable is that 
previous aid extended by donors could have the effects on poverty in the following year or 
over a period of time.  
4.0 Model Specification  
                                        𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦௜௧  = 𝛼଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃௜௧  + 𝛽ଶ𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖௜௧ + 𝜗௜௧  + 𝜀௜௧                     
(1.1) 
The econometric model used is a general specification for growth-poverty relation 
used by Perry et al (2006), Alvi & Senbeta (2011) in testing for growth-income distribution 
of poverty.  Where the dependent variable is a measure of poverty levels and the coefficient 
of 𝛽ଵ is the per capita income. 𝛽ଶ captures the Gini coefficient as it measures the inequality 
prevalent in African countries at time t. 𝜗௜௧  captures the unobserved country effects and the 
idiosyncratic error term is𝜀௜௧. Aid is then structured in the second equation and this enables to 
explain changes in foreign and how it affects poverty levels in recipient countries. Alvi and 
Senbeta (2012), in their empirical research they aggregated aid into bilateral and multilateral 
aid and they analyzed 79 countries in different regions. Their panel dataset was fairly 
balanced and their dependent variable poverty had a 3 year averages) 
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   𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦௜௧  = 𝛼଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃௜௧  +  𝛽ଶ𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖௜௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝐴𝑖𝑑௜௧ି + 𝑍௜௧ ′𝜃 + 𝜗௜௧  + 𝜀௜௧          
(1.2) 
 
Thus in this model the variable of interest is 𝛽ଷ as it measures the impact of aid on 
poverty. In this model I therefore control for other variables that have both direct and indirect 
effects of aid. Incorporating independent variables in the model is in line with the literature 
and empirics of foreign aid and poverty. I propose that there are other particular variables that 
raise aid effectiveness in the sense of reducing poverty and hence the need to incorporate 
other controlling independent variables in accordance with literature on foreign aid and 
poverty. i and t  subscripts in the model represents index country and year respectively. The 
aid effectiveness used in the dataset follows the standard definition of aid which is the ratio of 
net Official Development Assistance (ODA) relative to GNI.  
 
Independent variables incorporated in the model are growth enhancing policies such as trade 
openness, quality of institutions, and sound macroeconomic policies. Inflation as one of the 
independent variables is a macroeconomic indicator of sound economic policies. A higher 
inflation rate impedes poverty reduction efforts. Trade openness is calculated as total sum of 
exports and imports relative to the Gross Domestic Product (Frankel & Rommer, 1999). This 
implies that the more open a country is creates employment for unskilled labour force and 
can be a source of earnings. Trade openness is expected to reduce poverty levels in recipient 
countries.  Access to domestic credit as a proxy of financial development enables an increase 
in income share to the poor (Kunt &Levine, 2007).  Thus average income of the poor can be 
improved in relative distribution of income (ibid). A negative effect between poverty and 
financial development implies that countries with more developed and sound financial sector 
system, and are open to international trade, and this ultimately reduces  poverty (Alvi & 
Senbeta: 2011). Conversely, landlocked countries face trade competitive disadvantage and 
more likely to remain poor. Thus lack of access to good infrastructure which is prevalent to 
most African countries exacerbates poverty levels. Landlocked dummy captures the effects of 
geography and how it impacts poverty in African countries. The English and French colony 
dummy captures the long run effects of colonial origin (Lin 2009). 1 implies that a country is 
an English colony and 0 otherwise.  Institutional quality is measured by the International 
Country Risk Guide Index; it measures governance, focusing on bureaucratic quality, rule of 
law, and corruption (Brautigam & Knack, 2004). The Index gamut is on an 18 point scale. 
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Countries with better institutions have a higher index. Most African countries have low 
institutional quality. The country with a highest institutional quality has 7.  Brautigam & 
Knack, (2004), examined the relationship between ICRG index and tax revenues and 
observed a stronger relationship between aid and a decline in quality governance.  Index of 
economic freedom is also used as a proxy for government’s intervention in property rights 
institutions.  The index is calculated by aggregating four pillars, namely rule of law, 
government size, regulatory efficiency, and open markets.  The index is on a scale of 0 to 
100. A higher index implies more economic freedom. The data is obtained from Economic 
Freedom of the World (Heritage Foundation, 2018).   
4.1 Econometric Methodology  
 Assessing the impact of foreign aid on poverty, I employ the Ordinary Least Squares Method 
(OLS), Panel Fixed Effects (FE) and Two Stage Least Squares Method (2SLS).  The 2SLS 
with IV model corrects the endogeneity bias in my OLS estimates. This method also 
improves the efficiency of estimates.  In so doing using the GMM estimator enables lagged 
levels to be used as instruments for level equation. Consistency of SYSTEM GMM estimates 
largely depends on how valid the instruments are in absence of auto-serial correlation. 
Literature on institutions posit that they are endogenous in nature and since the motive of this 
research is to capture the economic impact of aid effectiveness  in reducing poverty; hence 
there is need to ensure that the results are not driven by endogenous differences in 
institutions. Thus in a bid to remove the effects of endogenous differences in institutions, I 
use GMM first differencing method. 
Assessing the impact of foreign aid and poverty, I first employ the simple OLS method, panel 
fixed effects and 2SLS method with an instrumental variable. The instrumental variable 
caters for endogeneity bias between foreign aid and poverty. I begin with the regression in 
Table (1). In this regression, I only incorporated a few controlling variables to see how they 
correlate with poverty. In this first OLS regression, the independent variables included are 
finance and real income per capita. All the variables seem to have an intuitive negative sign, 
as they show that foreign aid reduce poverty and the coefficients are statistically significant at 
1 percent. In these regressions I assume that poverty reduction can be achieved via growth-
led policies which in turn reduce poverty. Further, I incorporated other independent variables 
in relation to aid and poverty literature. 
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 I controlled for institutional quality as measured by ICRG index and it’s statistically 
significant at 1 percent implying that donor countries tend to allocate more aid to countries 
with good institutions. Collier and Dollar (2002) found similar results in their aid, growth and 
policies analysis when they analyzed the impact of good institutions in relation to aid 
allocation. In their findings, they concluded that aid is channeled to countries with good 
institutions.  I further controlled for macroeconomic factor variables such as trade openness, 
inflation, and private credit. Trade openness is lagged one period. Trade openness enters the 
model with a negative sign and it is statistically significant at 10 percent for poverty gap 
implying that countries which embrace the benefits of trade tend to reduce poverty for people 
living below the poverty datum line threshold. In this case, if countries are open to trade, it 
creates employment for their low level unskilled workers; hence a consistent of earnings in 
wages can therefore enable reduction in poverty. Thus trade openness can have different 
impacts on skilled and unskilled labour both on tradable and non-tradable sectors in both 
short and long run (Lin 2009; 75). However, it can be inferred that trade openness is only 
effective in reducing poverty gap and though it has a correct sign, it is no longer statistically 
significant in other poverty measures. Elvi and Senbeta (2012) found similar results on trade 
openness when they assessed the impact of foreign aid on poverty reduction using a System 
GMM method. Based on their results trade openness was only effective in alleviating poverty 
severity. All other variables are incorporated in the model to control for the possible omitted 
variable bias that could be correlated with the error term and have a bias on my estimates. 
The estimates for other control variables show that the quality of institutions, private credit, 
landlocked dummy and the English colony all have positive effects on poverty levels.  The 
GINI coefficient has a positive impact on poverty; implying that a percentage increase in 
GINI coefficient result in 0.007 percent increase in poverty depth. I further decided to test for 
Kuznets’ inverted U shape; in so doing I incorporated Gross Domestic Product and a single-
lagged Gross Domestic Product. If the Inverted U shape hypothesis holds then the 
coefficients of these two variables should be significantly negative. Thus based on my 
estimates, the Kuznets’ inverted U shape is rejected.  
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The OLS estimates can be biased due to the issue of omitted variables, reverse causality in 
foreign aid and poverty and measurement error.  Though I have lagged some of the 
independent variables but there is still a possibility of endogeneity bias arising from the 
reverse causality in foreign aid and endogenous institutions. I ran a panel fixed effects and 
panel random effects, and after conducting a Hausmann’s test, I rely on the Panel Fixed 
Effects estimates. Conducting panel fixed effects enables to control the impact of omitted 
variables. In this case panel data contain information on intertemporal dynamics and 
individuality of the entities may allow one to control the effects of unobserved country effects 
(Wooldridge, Chapter 14: 2013). Panel fixed estimates results are reported in Table 2. It can 
be inferred that some variables are dropped due to collinearity problems. However, the 
variable of interest foreign aid still remains statistically significant in all poverty levels and 
with a correct negative sign.  I further controlled for country fixed effects and time dummy 
and the results are reported with robust standard errors.  
 I have also conducted a 2SLS with freedom of speech as an instrumental variable for aid. 
Instrumental variables are used to help capture the effects of endogeneity bias. If not 
carefully dealt with a further challenge of endogeneity can cause an attenuation bias. Foreign 
aid may either influence freedom of press both positively and negatively. Positively when aid 
is channeled in supporting media infrastructure and when it’s providing policy advice by 
transferring knowledge to journalists. Conversely, aid can influence freedom of press by 
minimizing the existence of democratic checks. Hence this enables bad governments to stay 
in power and conceal the misappropriation of funds. Aid can also negatively impact the 
freedom of press in autocratic countries due to corruption and lack of transparency and 
accountability (Dutta and Williamson, 2016).  Due to the endogenous nature of institutions, I 
have used legal origin as an instrumental variable, legal origin is a dummy on whether a 
country has common law or otherwise.  
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The two stages for structural equation can be identified by the following equations: 
𝑌௜ = 𝛼ଵ଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝑃ଶ + 𝑍ଵ𝛽ଵ + 𝑢ଵ      (1.3) 
and  
𝑌ଶ = 𝛼ଶ଴ + 𝛽ଶ𝑃ଵ + 𝑍ଶ𝛽ଶ + 𝑢ଶ       (1.4) 
Thus in these structural equations, Y1 and Y2 are endogenous variables and  𝑢ଵ 𝑢ଶ are 
structural error terms. Aid is assumed as endogenous in relation to the aid effectiveness 
literature. Variable 𝑍ଵ represent a set of k*1 exogenous variables. Z1and Z2 contains 
exogenous variables and this implies that I have imposed exclusion restrictions on the model. 
Thus since I am assuming that foreign aid and poverty are endogenous by using this 
structural equation I am trying to eliminate the potential bias. Further, I assume exclusion 
restrictions by assuming that the cov ( 𝜀௜, p) = 0. Where 𝜀 represents the error for equation 1 
and 2 (Woodridge 2013, Chapter 16:538).  In running the two stages least square estimation 
method, I controlled for the endogenous aid with freedom of press as the instrumental 
variable. I further controlled for the endogenous institutions by incorporation of legal of 
origin dummy as an instrumental variable for institutions. In doing this, I followed the 
literature on endogenous institutions by Acemoglu et al (2005) procedure. All countries have 
distinct and peculiar legal origins which matter in maintaining the rule of law and financial 
development. The use of the dummy variable as an instrument is in accordance with the 
literature on institutions.  Countries which the British settled they influenced setting of 
common law and those in which the French countries settled influenced the setting of civil 
laws. 
 
4.2 Discussion of Empirical Results  
Referring to the findings of the 2SLS estimation method in Table 3, results show that 1 
percentage point increase in aid results in a reduction in poverty gap by 0.02 percent, and the 
result is statistically significant at 1 percent. Aid is effective in reducing poverty in all 
poverty level measures. Finance to the households enters the model with a negative sign and 
has also been statistically significant across all poverty levels, implying that a percent change 
in access to finance result in 1.91 percent reduction in poverty gap. This further implies that 
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in a well developed financial sector it can therefore enhance households receiving substantial 
income that can subsequently reduce poverty. However, the growth led policies as posited by 
the GDP enter the model on a negative sign but are not statistically significant for poverty 
gap and poverty depth. Further it can be ascertained that controlling for other macroeconomic 
factors and institutions quality, private credit, landlocked, English colony dummy, and GINI 
coefficient they remain with the same sign as in the OLS results and statistically significant.  
Private credit shows that a percentage change in private credit results in an increase in 
poverty by 0.7 percent for both poverty gap and depth. The English dummy is a variable 
between 0 and 1 -- 1 if the country is a British colony and 0 otherwise.  
Further, as a robustness check, I decided to employ the System GMM Method to find out if I 
can receive similar results by employing lagged dependent variables as instruments. This 
enables me to capture the possible endogeneity of incorporating GDP and aid in the same 
regression, because once we employ time averages, GDP and aid will be jointly endogenous 
(Daalgard et al, 2004:F202). Consistency of the GMM estimation method largely depends on 
the validity of instruments (Elvi & Senbeta, 2012). Validity of the instruments used and 
method of moments conditions are tested using the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 
and further serial autocorrelation is tested using an Arellano-Bond first and second order 
autocorrelation test. In these regressions I fail to reject the null hypothesis suggesting that the 
lagged instruments are valid and that there is no serial autocorrelation. System equations are 
calculated as follows: 
𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦௜௧ =∝ 𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦௜௧ିଵ + 𝑥′௜௧𝛽 + 𝑣௜ + 𝜀௜௧        (1.5) 
First differencing in equations results in  ∆𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦௜௧ =  𝛼∆𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦௜௧ିଵ + ∆𝑥′௜௧𝛽 +  ∆𝜀௜௧  
(1.6) 
Moments of this equation are that 𝐸(𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦௧ି௦ ∆𝜀௜௧) = 0 for lagged poverty and for 
independent variables covariates the equation is as follows: 
𝐸(𝑥௜௧ି௦∆𝜀௜௧) = 0  ∀ t≫ 3, … . 𝑇 and S≫ 2 for the covariates. If I then condition for auto serial 
correlation then E(∆𝜀௜௧∆𝜀௜௧ିଵ = 0) for t=2.  The moment conditions in level equations are  
𝐸(∆𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦௜௧ିଵ𝜑௜௧) = 0 for the lagged poverty variable and 𝐸൫∆𝑋௜,௧ିଵ𝜑௜௧൯ = 0 ∀ 𝑡 ≫
3, … . . , 𝑇 for covariates. The condition for no second-order serial autocorrelation is 
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𝐸൫∆𝜀௜௧∆𝜀௜,௧ିଵ൯ = 0  for t=2 
I however find similar results in comparison to the 2SLS results after controlling for other 
macroeconomic variables suggesting that the foreign aid can have a negative reducing effect 
on poverty even after applying different econometric methods.  
                                           Table 2: Ordinary Least Square Estimation 
Estimation 
Method  
(OLS1) (OLS 2) (OLS 3) (OLS 4) (OLS 5) (OLS 6) 
 LogP0 LogP0 LogP1 LogP1 LogP2 LogP2 
       
Log AID -0.0800*** -0.0668*** -0.0716** -0.0611*** -0.0611* -0.0568** 
 (0.0288) (0.0223) (0.0353) (0.0225) (0.0419) (0.0264) 
Log Finance  -1.256*** -1.053*** -1.712*** -1.685*** -2.049*** -2.088*** 
 (0.0683) (0.0594) (0.0836) (0.0608) (0.0993) (0.0712) 
Log GDP  -0.101** -0.100** -0.0294 0.00207 0.0432 0.0843* 
 (0.0444) (0.0398) (0.0544) (0.0403) (0.0646) (0.0473) 
Institutional 
Quality  
 0.0689***  0.0651***  0.0709*** 
  (0.0125)  (0.0128)  (0.0150) 
Trade Openness  -0.112*  -0.0364  -0.0312 
  (0.0614)  (0.0630)  (0.0738) 
Private Credit   0.876***  0.433**  0.322 
  (0.192)  (0.200)  (0.234) 
Landlocked  0.130***  0.0536  0.0350 
  (0.0379)  (0.0396)  (0.0465) 
English Colony   0.170***  0.0798**  0.0772* 
  (0.0370)  (0.0397)  (0.0466) 
GINI     0.00722***  0.01000*** 
    (0.000475)  (0.000557) 
Constant 10.37*** 9.404*** 10.87*** 9.719*** 11.11*** 9.974*** 
 (0.212) (0.593) (0.260) (0.601) (0.308) (0.705) 
       
Observations 470 258 470 258 470 258 
R-squared 0.738 0.834 0.747 0.905 0.731 0.906 
Note: Dependent variables are Log Poverty gap (P0), Poverty Depth (P1) and Poverty 
Severity (P2). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  
*** Significant at 1 percent  
**  Significant at 5 percent  
*   Significant at 10 percent  
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Table 3: Panel Fixed Effects Estimation 
 
Estimation Method  (FE 1) (FE 2) (FE 3) 
 Log P0 Log P1 Log P2 
    
Log Aid  -0.01858** -0.0128** -0.0201*** 
 (0.0201) (0.0245) (0.0308) 
Log Finance -0.907*** -1.386*** -1.716*** 
 (0.0653) (0.0796) (0.0999) 
Log GDP  -0.284*** -0.222*** -0.151* 
 (0.0555) (0.0677) (0.0850) 
Log Trade openness 0.249* 0.257 0.284 
 (0.139) (0.169) (0.213) 
Log Private Credit  -0.0292 -0.252 -0.383 
 (0.204) (0.249) (0.313) 
Log Inflation  -0.0134 -0.00828 -0.00715 
 (0.0118) (0.0144) (0.0181) 
Log Population -0.0410** -0.0442** -0.0494* 
 (0.0179) (0.0218) (0.0274) 
GINI Coefficient 0.00232*** 0.00633*** 0.00961*** 
 (0.000481) (0.000586) (0.000736) 
Constant 8.583*** 8.978*** 8.882*** 
 (1.020) (1.244) (1.562) 
    
Observations 347 347 347 
R-squared 0.738 0.787 0.773 
Number of countries  42 42 42 
Note: The dependent variable is poverty gap (P0), poverty depth (P1), and poverty Severity 
(P2). Robust standard errors appear in parentheses.  
 *** Significant at 1 percent, 
  **Significant at 5 percent,  
  * Significant at 10 percent 
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 Table 4: Two Stage Least Squares Estimation Method  
 
Estimation Method  (2SLS ) (2SLS ) (2SLS) 
 LogP0 LogP1 LogP2 
    
Log Aid  -0.241*** -0.217*** -0.175** 
 (0.0477) (0.0577) (0.0771) 
Log Finance -1.096*** -1.628*** -2.030*** 
 (0.103) (0.102) (0.131) 
Log GDP per capita  -0.106* -0.00442 0.104 
 (0.0626) (0.0700) (0.0961) 
Institutional Quality 0.0522*** 0.0632*** 0.0751*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0150) (0.0202) 
Trade Openness -0.172*** -0.0694 0.0254 
 (0.0525) (0.0559) (0.0780) 
Private Credit  0.681*** 0.686*** 0.622** 
 (0.243) (0.248) (0.286) 
Landlocked  0.163*** 0.172*** 0.157*** 
 (0.0360) (0.0370) (0.0445) 
English Colony 0.00673 -0.00670 -0.0445 
 (0.0563) (0.0528) (0.0570) 
GINI Coeffiecient 0.00230*** 0.00663*** 0.0103*** 
 (0.000646) (0.000630) (0.000696) 
Constant 10.73*** 10.29*** 9.576*** 
 (0.663) (0.763) (1.072) 
    
Observations 154 154 154 
R-squared 0.950 0.967 0.967 
Note: The dependent variable is poverty gap (P0), poverty depth (P1), and poverty Severity 
(P2). White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors appear in parentheses. P values for 
test of exogeneity are in brackets. 
 *** Significant at 1 percent, 
  **Significant at 5 percent,  
  * Significant at 10 percent.  
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Table 5: GMM Estimation Method  
Estimation Method  (GMM 1) (GMM 2) (GMM 3) (GMM 4) (GMM 5) (GMM 6) 
 Log P0 Log P0 LogP1  Log P1 Log P2 Log P2  
       
Log Aid  -1.581*** -0.229*** -1.965*** -0.216*** -2.187*** -0.164** 
 (0.430) (0.0416) (0.538) (0.0572) (0.610) (0.0770) 
Log Finance   -1.199***  -1.658***  -2.055*** 
  (0.110)  (0.102)  (0.127) 
Log GDP   -0.0429  0.0175  0.126 
  (0.0603)  (0.0703)  (0.0955) 
Trade Openness  -0.133***  -0.0551  0.0282 
  (0.0456)  (0.0569)  (0.0747) 
Private Credit   0.587**  0.599**  0.604** 
  (0.231)  (0.237)  (0.284) 
Inflation   -0.0380*  -0.0306  -0.0168 
  (0.0196)  (0.0247)  (0.0314) 
Landlocked   0.124***  0.170***  0.165*** 
  (0.0347)  (0.0390)  (0.0446) 
English Colony   0.0435  -0.00251  -0.0601 
  (0.0583)  (0.0585)  (0.0609) 
Institutional Quality  0.0576***  0.0647***  0.0746*** 
  (0.0121)  (0.0146)  (0.0201) 
GINI Coefficient   0.00255***  0.00686***  0.0106*** 
  (0.000591)  (0.000640)  (0.000684) 
Constant 10.04*** 10.50*** 10.56*** 10.24*** 10.72*** 9.488*** 
 (1.718) (0.555) (2.162) (0.764) (2.458) (1.047) 
       
Observations 119 89 119 89 119 89 
R-squared  0.951  0.968  0.967 
Notes: The dependent variable is Poverty gap (P0), Poverty Depth (P1) and Poverty Severity 
(P2). Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The t-statistics in regression (2), (4) and 
(6) are based on a small sample with a corrected covariance estimates. Instruments used 
freedom of speech, and lagged poverty levels. They are all lagged one period. The two step 
Sargan test statistics which are consistent in case of heteroskedasticity are reported. *** 
Significant at 1% , ** significant at 5 %, * significant at 10%. 
 
Incorporating the instrumental variables freedom of press and economic freedom in a 
2SLS regression in Table 3, it can be inferred that a percentage change increase in foreign aid 
results in a 2 percent reduction in poverty. The result is statistically significant in all three 
measures of poverty. The findings are consistent with the findings of Elvi & Senbeta (2012); 
after controlling for average income effects, they found that a percentage increase in aid 
reduced poverty by 3 percent. After aggregating aid, they also found that an increase in 
multilateral aid reduced poverty by 2 percent. The negative impact of finance can be 
attributed to the prominent role of financial sector development as a necessary tool in 
eradicating poverty. Easing credit and borrowing constraints to the poor can bring about 
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improvements in productivity which can ultimately reduce poverty (Beck et al, 2007).   
Income per capita enters the model with a negative sign and is only statistically significant at 
10 percent in poverty gap. Mosley et al, (2004) found similar results when they assessed the 
relationship between foreign aid and poverty. Alvi and Senbeta, (2012) found that income per 
capita reduced poverty in all poverty levels and it was statistically significant at 1 percent 
after they aggregated aid in bilateral and multilateral aid and controlled for trade openness, 
GINI, age dependency ratio and democracy score. The GINI coefficient estimates are 
consistent with literature on aid effectiveness. A 1 percent increase in inequality as measured 
by the Gini coefficient results in a 0.01 percent increase in poverty severity. I tested for 
regressor endogeneity between OLS and IV estimators using Hausmann test principle that 
provided a test of whether the regressor was endogenous and based on the results there was 
need to instrument for foreign aid. In so doing after incorporating the IV of freedom of 
speech as an instrument for foreign aid I had to test for overidentifying restrictions using the 
Hansen’s J test and Sargan’s test under the hypothesis that all instruments are valid. Chi 
Squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of overidentifying 
restriction. I failed to reject the null hypothesis. Further the Cragg Donald Wald F-Statistic 
was 16.22 with a benchmark of 10 implying that the instruments used are not weak.  
In Table 5, I ran the GMM model after removing the endogenous institutions by first 
differencing refer to (Acemoglu et al, 2003: 7a). The panel GMM method further controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity and serial auto correlation between variables. After incorporating 
the freedom of speech and lagged poverty levels, it can be inferred that aid seems to reduce 
poverty in all levels and it’s highly statistically significant at 1 percent. Controlling for other 
macroeconomic variables and controlling for the impact of time invariant factors it can be 
observed that there is a significant change in the levels at which foreign aid reduces poverty. 
1 percent increase in aid results in 0.2 percent reduction in poverty gap index. The results are 
almost similar to the 2SLS estimates.  
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4.3 Policy Implication  
The policy implication on the efficacy of foreign aid effectiveness has been widely contested 
by policy makers and economists. Some opponents of aid citing that aid in recipient countries 
have detrimental effects on the private sector; perpetuate bad governments to stay in power or 
in some instances waste aid on frivolous expenses. The effectiveness of foreign aid is 
therefore challenged especially in Sub-Saharan African countries where there has been a huge 
influx of foreign aid. In this empirical research I have shown that foreign aid has poverty 
reducing effect when we control for other macroeconomic factors and for average income 
distribution. The results do not specify that giving aid is the only the solution to poverty 
alleviation. Aid is only one facet to the puzzle that should be treated with caution aid can lead 
to aid-dependency in recipient countries and Dutch disease. In order for aid to work to 
achieve convergence between rich and poor countries, donor countries should be consistent in 
their aid giving with 0.7 percent of their Gross National Income channeled towards effective 
development in recipient countries. Based on the empirical findings it can be observed that 
good institutions and sound macroeconomic policies can be quite beneficial for the recipient 
countries as a means to poverty eradication. Therefore donor countries should also 
concentrate on channeling aid to countries with good policies and higher poverty levels. So 
doing enables transparency and allows for accountability for recipient countries to effectively 
and rightfully allocate aid in the sectors that it is intended for. Making aid effective in 
recipient countries might call for strong harmonization between donor and recipient countries 
in understanding critical areas that might call for urgent funding. Many at times have 
observed donor countries issuing aid in sectors that the recipient countries might not need aid. 
This enables underutilization of aid in recipient countries and many at times funds being 
misappropriated or channeled towards budget financing deficits.  
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5.0 Conclusion  
To summarize, this paper analyzed the economic impact of foreign aid on poverty 
reduction. It can therefore be inferred that an increase in aid reduces poverty in SSA countries 
as ascertained from the results found in the empirical analysis. This indicates that aid has a 
direct effect on poverty reduction and the result is robust even after controlling for other 
variables, excluding outliers and using different estimation techniques.  A policy implication 
that can be drawn from this study is that aid channeling can be improved by exploiting the 
direct effect of targeting the poor directly and alternatively rather through increased averages 
incomes following aid lowers poverty indirectly (Senbeta 2009: 37). The finding that aid has 
a strong impact on reducing poverty to recipient countries has been echoed by a number of 
researchers, Ravallion & Chen (1997), Besley & Burgess (2003), Kray (2006), Alvi & 
Senbeta (2012) among others.  
However, aid is at work in most African countries and thus donors should channel it 
towards promoting country owned development strategies. In this way aid can lead to 
sustained growth and poverty alleviation. Of course, the donors should channel aid to 
countries with sound economic policies and good institutions, those that promote the rule of 
law, enforcement of contracts and property rights in order to ensure that aid is not 
misappropriated.  The reason why many countries may still be poor today despite receiving a 
substantial amount of foreign aid may not be the fact that aid is not working; it might be due 
to other geopolitical factors, or poor governance structures governing foreign aid, or the 
conditionality attached to the foreign aid by donors.   
In as much as the effectiveness of foreign aid continues to be debated in academic and 
policy circles, the results presented in this paper signify that aid can be an effective tool in 
ameliorating poverty in SSA. Thus, increased official development assistance is being 
proposed as an ambitious plan to cut the proportion number of people living in absolute 
poverty by 2030. After examining the direct effects of poverty using three poverty measures: 
poverty gap, poverty depth and poverty severity, it can be ascertained that aid reduces 
poverty after controlling for average income distribution. Further, the development of the 
financial markets, ensuring that credit is made accessible to the poor, and sound 
macroeconomic policies are a necessity as useful strategic tools to reduce poverty in most 
Sub-Saharan African countries. To answer the question why Sub-Saharan African countries 
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remains poor even after receiving large amounts of aid can be as a result of other factors such 
as high levels of corruption, embezzlement of donor funds, violence, conflict among different 
ethnicities, poor governance, collective action problems, and poor accountability structures in 
most African countries. If SSA could not have received this aid, perhaps the levels of poverty 
and inequality could have risen to insurmountable figures to this very day. Therefore aid 
could be working in reducing poverty and its effects could be observed in the long run. 
However, this is not to say that SSA countries should heavily rely on aid as the only 
mechanism to reduce poverty. Aid cannot be the only panacea to solve a myriad of problems 
facing most African countries. Hence the need to harness other opportunities that can be 
necessary to alleviate poverty, e.g. embracing trade benefits by not only depending on 
commodity trading but enhancing value of those primary goods, financial sector reform, 
creation of employment for majority of youth among other factors.  
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  Appendix  
Table A1:  COUNTRY COVERAGE OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN 
COUNTRIES  
Angola Ghana  Sao Tome and Principe   
Benin Guinea  Senegal    
Botswana Guinea-Bissau Seychelles   
Burkina Faso Kenya Sierra Leone   
Burundi  Lesotho South Africa   
Cabo Verde Liberia Sudan   
Cameroon Madagascar Swaziland   
Central African Republic Malawi  Tanzania   
Chad  Mali  Togo    
Comoros Mauritania Uganda   
Congo, Democratic Republic 
of Mauritius Zambia   
Congo, Republic of Mozambique Zimbabwe   
Cote d'Ivoire Namibia    
Ethiopia Niger     
Gabon  Nigeria     
Gambia Rwanda    
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TABLE  A2: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DATA SOURCES 
Variable  Variable definition  Source  
LogP0 (Poverty Gap Index)  Log of proportion of people living below the poverty line  PovcalNet, World Bank  
LogP1( Poverty Depth Index)  Log of the average income shortfall as a share of poverty line  PovcalNet, World Bank  
LogP2 ( Severity Poverty Index)  Log of the average income shortfall as share poverty line  PovcalNet, World Bank  
Aid  Aid Effectiveness, Aid per cent of Gross National Income  
World Bank Indicators, 
World Bank  
Private credit  
Private credit by deposit money 
banks and other financial institutions 
relative to GDP  
World Bank Indicators, 
World Bank  
Population  Log Population  World Bank Indicators, World Bank  
Trade Openness  Log of (exports + imports)of goods and services as a share of GDP  
World Bank Indicators, 
World Bank  
Finance  Log of the mean annual household income in 2011 PPP PovcalNet, World Bank  
Inflation  Log of the Inflation Rate  World Bank Indicators, World Bank  
Gini  Log of the Gini coefficient  PovcalNet, World Bank  
Landlocked  Dummy variable, 1 if the country is landlocked and 0 otherwise  
UNCTAD Book of 
Statistics 2005  
Economic Freedom Index  
Economic Freedom is graded on a 
scale form of 0 to 100. A country’s 
overall score is derived by averaging 
these twelve economic freedoms, 
with equal weight being given to 
each. 
Heritage of Foundation, 
2018 
Legal Origin  Dummy Variable, 1 if the country has Common law and 0 otherwise  
Legal Origin Data is 
collected from CIA World 
Fact Book  
English Colony  
Dummy variable, 1 if the country 
was colonized by Britain and 0 
otherwise  
 Data is collected from 
CIA World Fact Book  
Real Gross Domestic Per Capita  Log GDP per Capita, PPP( constant 2011  international dollar)  
World Bank Indicators, 
World Bank  
Institutional Quality  
  
 
 
 
ICRG Index  
 
 
Data obtained from 
Deborah Brautigam and 
Stephen Knack (2004), 
Burnside and Dollar 
(2001)  
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Negative Correlation Graphs between GDP and Poverty Levels  
Figure 1A: Poverty Gap and GDP Negative Relationship  
 
Figure 1B: Poverty Depth and GDP Negative Correlation 
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FIGURE 1C: Poverty Severity and GDP Negative Correlation  
 
Figure 2A: Poverty Gap and Foreign Aid Negative Relationship  
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Figure 2B: Poverty Depth and Aid Negative Relationship  
 
Figure 2C: Poverty Severity and Aid Negative Relationship 
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